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Most inquiries into early child development emphasize the undifferentia-
ted state of the organism and his embeddedness in the environment. Develop-
ment, subsequently, is considered as a differentiation of objects and, more
basically, of the subject from the object. In accepting su~h an interpre-
tation--and what choice is there?--it becomes apparent how inappropriate a'
stimulus-response theory would be. Stimuli and responses do not yet exist
as separate conditions; they need to be differentiated before any acquisition
based upon them can be explained. Similarly, associations cannot connect
stimuli and responses according to their con~iguity, .frequency, or recency;
everything is connected anyhow. The first task for the child is to
recognize some constancies in the. flux of his sensory impressions and in
the shifts of his motoric expressions.
Many cognitive and philosophical psychologists have provided interpre-
tations of early development similar to the one attempt~d here. Most notably,
Heinz Werner (1926) has elaborated the early differentiat.ion (and concurrent
integration) of the child's experiences, and Piaget (l963), likewise, has
explicated processes leading to schemata of perceptions and actions.
In focusing upon Piaget's work, we will compare his interpretation of
cognitive development with the early.acquisiti~nof language and meaning.
In both cases, the child is confronted with a. flux of events and his main
developmental task consists in recognizing constancies in the flux of his
impressions and invariances in the stream of his expressions. Only after
1Presently at Educational Testing Service.
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these constancies and invariances have been recognized and practiced can
learning in the traditional sense be considered as a means for acquisition.
In spite of similarities in the goals of cognitive and language develop-
ment, the task of recognizing constancies in the general physical environment
and of invariances in the more specific sound and speech environment points
toward basic differences which might have prevented any mutual benefit or a
simple consolidation of both interpretations. The former constancies might
be regarded as synchronic-spatial structures (with the supplementary option
of temporal shifts and changes); the latter invariances have to be regarded
as diachronic-temporal structures (with the rather advanced technological
option of fixating them in space through written transformations or on
magnetic tape).
Of course, such a contrast overemphasizes the differences. The con-
stancies of objects in space may represent stable states during short periods
of time only; the" objects change and move. Moreover, the subject through
his own movements creates for himself continuously changing impressions of
these "stable" objects. When. on the other hand, a person perceives an
invariant section within a speech sequence, for example a word, his percept
will activate a conceptual field (Trier, 1931) or network (Quillian, 1967;
Riegel, 1968; Riegel &Riegel, 1963) representing his past experiences related
to this word. Thus, a synchronic structure is brought to his attention, often
identified with the subj~ctive semantic organization of the language. As
subsequent "units are perceived by the listener, other semantic structures are
called upon blending into one another and modifying the earlier structures.
The sequential progression across synchronic semantic structures represents
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the diachronic organization of the language which has been identifi~dwith its
syntactic order. Because of the sequential blending of the synchronic structures,
the distinction between both organizations, again. overemphasizes their dif-
ferences at the expense of their similarities.
The above distinction, furthermore. holds only for an individual who
has already acquired a fair amount of perceptual-cognitive and linguistic
experiences. The young child has to generate. first, these semantic and
syntactic orders. Of course, we do not wish to neglect the fact that the
language of the environment as well as the general physical surrounding already
possess a high degree of segmentation and structure. These are either properties
of nature (such as the formation of rocks, mountains. plants, animals. including
the human organs for cognition and speech) or, more importantly • have been
generated through human efforts (such as rooms, bUildings, cities, social
!
organizations, language). Students of learning and association have system-
atically neglected the structural properties of the world and pretended as if
the child were born into a random world of chaos.
The young child has not yet experienced these outer structures. His
development, essentially, consists of recreating these outer organizations
through his own activities and on the basis of his own. inner structures.
At the same time, these outer organizations will be induced upon him through
the efforts of the group of people around him. This group does not only
include all persons who are attending him, but the whole contemporary and,
in the end. all previous generations who laid the foundation and are con-
tinuously creating the physical and social world in which the child grows up.
The child through his own activities also partakes in changing this world, at
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least those sections that are experienced by the persons in his immediate
social environment. i.e., his parents, siblings, neighbors, etc. Indeed,
the child's activities might produce more dramatic changes in his parents,
for example, than the parents are able to produce in the child.
In the following presentation. we outlin~ the processes by which the
child recognizes and regenerates some invariant and organizational proper-
ties of language. In these efforts, the Child will conjoin and contrast
recurrent segments of the message~ presented to him. For example, the
child might hear sequences such as "Drink your milk," "The milk is too hot,"
"We have to buy some milk,1t etc. After repeated exposure to such messages,
the child recognizes invariant segments, for example the word MILK. Using
a visual analog, we T,Uight think of these statements as written upon strips
of paper; the child would then bundle these strips together with the in-
variant segment at .the intersection. As we will attempt to show, both the
identification of meanings as well as the formation of classes can be ex-
plained on this basis.
Similar arguments can be made fo~ operations at the phonetic level
leading to the recognition of the phonemes of the given language. While
phoneme recognition will be consciously activated only through the inter-
vention of teachers •. the recognition of meaningful units,such as words, may
be initiated by the child himself. Recognition and transmission of meanings
is, after all, the main purpose of language. These operations, furthermore,
are not bound to smallest elements, such as letters, syllables or words, but
involve more complex units as well, $uch as phrases, parts of sentences and,
perhaps, whole sentences and express.ions. The acquisitions of their units
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are fused with syntactic developments which cannot and should not be separated
from those of semantic structures.
In the second part of the following presentation, we emphasize the
acquisition of words, classes, class relations and, generally, of the
semantic and syntactic organization of language. The basis for these de-
velopments are contextual segments whose smallest mits we will call simple
relations. All of these acquisitions succeed through active operations by
the child with and upon the relational information given. These operations
consist in intersecting or composing (as well as decomposing), conjoining
or aligning (as well as separating) of relational information.
We are not able to explain much further how these operations originate
in the child. But in the first part of our presentation. we will discuss
language acquisition as an unadulterated process of activities with little
consideration for the products and structures generated. In particular.
we compare linguistic operations with those in economy by describing three
stages in the development of monetary systems: the barter system. the
coinage system, and the debenture system. Similarly, we will delineate
three levels in the origin, development, and study of language: the proto-
language. the token language. and the interaction language. Tangentially,
we will also argue that the intellectual processes involved are roughly
comparable to three stages of cognitive development as originally proposed
by Piaget: the period of the senso~y-motor activity. the period of concrete
operations (including the subperiods of preoperational and concrete operational
thinking). and the period of formal operations.
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Monetary and Linguistic Systems: A Developmental
and Historical Comparison
The relationship between goods or merchandise and the labor or activi-
ties necessary to produce them has been regarded, at least since Marx (1891),
as dialectic: labor that does not produce something is futile; goods that
are not produced by labor are miracles. In the following discussions we
equate labor with the acts of producing or perceiving speech; merchandise
with speech products, such as sentences, words, or speech sounds. Through
acts of speech a person increases the individual and collective repertoire of
linguistic products. This repertoire is comparable to capital in the economic
sense. Capital is only useful for the individual and the society when it is
productive, i.e., when it is transformed into new labor, speech acts. Tradi-
tionally, linguists have regarded language as commodity but not as labor.
The barter system and the proto-language. Our monetary system originated
from the one-to-one bartering trade in simple hunting and farming societies.
A social situation in which one participant exchanges, for instance, a sheep
or a pig against a certain amount of grain or wool seems to have few
similarities with a situation of linguistic exchanges. The items traded do
not have any representational or symbolic value but serve to satisfy direct
needs of the persons participating in the exchange. Basic similarities
become apparent, however. once we realize that languages also are systems of
social interactions in which not the objects but rather the labor that leads
to their creation and possession is exchanged. Strictly speaking, objects do
not play an essential role in such an exchange. Where would they come from.
how would they be generated except through the efforts of the participating
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individuals? It is the labor involved in raising or catching the animal. in
the seeding, tending. and harvesting the crop that is being exchanged. The
exchange value is determined by the amount of effort, the diligence of the
required skills, and the scarcity of the available resources (which, in turn,
need to be acquired and secured through the organisms' efforts).
Many linguists and, especially, psychologists look upon sentences, words,
or speech sounds as building blocks or objects of language. But language is
basically an activity which, in turn, serves to induce or to provoke activities
in others. This comparison is similar to, though not identical with, de
Saussure's distinction between la langue and la parole. The former, char-
acterizing the universal properties of language, represents the total
repertoire of forms and the structure that has emerged through the efforts of
mankind. Surprisingly, as Labov (1970) noted, la langue has been studied by
relying on the "linguistic intuitions" of one or a few individuals. A science
of parole, though never developed, would have to deal with various speech
actions in different social contexts.
Language as an activity reveals itself most clearly under primitive condi-
tions comparable to those of the barter trade. Through grunts, cries, gestures
and manipulations, i.e., in BUhler's (1934) terms through "signals" and "symptoms,"
one participant might induce the other to recognize a danger, to give assistance,
or to coordinate activities. The sounds and movements might be recorded as
objectifications of such a primitive language by the linguists, but these
transcriptions provide only a distorted picture of the needs and intentions
or the activities involved. These activities are meaningful in a given
situation and in an immediate manner. In the linguist's description their
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meaning is bleached; they become abstract and rigidified (see Malinowski~
1923) •
Already at this level, language as well as commercial exchanges rely on
basic rules. The barter system presupposes property rights. If it is not
granted, for example, that the sheep belongs to person A and the grain to
person B, no stable exchanges, not even thievery, can take place. In Piaget's
sense, this type of commercial activity is comparable to the level of sensory-
motor operations. One item is exchanged against another item regardless of
the particular shapes in which they happen to be found. Trade does not yet
require a knowledge of conservation.
Similarly, proto-linguistic communication presupposes the constancy of
expression which, once given, cannot be undone. In this sense they have
immediate, existential meaning. Language at the proto-linguistic level is
bound to a given situation of high survival but of low symbolic value. Its
increase in representational character can be compared to that occurring
during the change from a barter to a coinage system.
The coinage system and the token language. (a) When changing from the
barter to the coinage system, communities select one of their major commodities
as a standard.for exchange. In agricultural societies a certain quantity of
grain might serve this function, in stock-farming societies the horse, the cow
or the sheep. (In ancient Rome, the word for money, pecunia, derives from
pecus denoting livestock.)
Shifts in standard commodities indicate the growing diversification of
societies. This growth is determined by variations in geographical and
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climatic conditions~ It has to be brought about, however, by the activities
of generations 'of participating members. Through these activities, society
progresses toward more advanced forms of manufacturing and industrial
production, and, at the same time, toWard a division of labor. Such develop-
ments increase the significance of natural resources other than food crops,
such as stone, wood, wool, coal, and--most important--metals. Because of
their scarcity, compactness and endurance but also because the resources can
be easily controlled by the'dominating classes of the society, metals soon
became the exclusive standard for monetary systems.
The transition from the barter system to a coinage system is not neces-
sarily abrupt (see Cipolla, 1956). After 'one or a few items have been selected
as standard commodities, the exchange continues to proceed as before. When
metals are introduced to serve as standards they' continue, at first, to fulfill
basic needs of everyday life. Fot instance, metals such as copper, bronze or
iron are not only used as currency but the coins also serve as standard weights
as well as'provide the material for the production of tools and weapons.
As the society advances, these common metals are replaced as standards for
exchanges by others which' are less readily avadLabke, Subsequently, smaller
and lighter coins can be introduced whos'e mining, melting, and minting is
more easily controlled and which do not serve essential functions for tool
making but rather those of luxury and extravagance. For example, in the Roman
Empire, bronze coins with a standard weight of 327.45 grams were substituted by
much smaller silver and gold coins. Whereas, the amount of metal of the bronze
coins had a direct, nonmediated value for the re~eiver, rare metals, such as
silver and gold, lacked such utility. Therefore, refined rules about their use
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had to be established by the comm~ity; the value.of the coins had to be
guaranteed by the state through laws which s.et the standards. determined the
metal composition. and regulated their distribution. At the same time~ classes
of persons, who succeeded in controlling the processing of these rare metals,
could set themselves apart a$ the rulers of their society.
As coins los t their foundation upon the concrete value of commodities
but gained in symbolic. value. the economy expanded rapidly. At the same time,
through the reckless manipulation of a· few ·and through the uncritical trust
of many. the changed conditio~s were selfishly exploited. The emergi~g.histories
represent an unending sequence of catastrophies. inflations and devaluations
(Gaettens. 1955). Imperialistic expansions (from the Punic Wars to the war in
Vietnam) always outpaced the growth of the economic and monetary systems. Since
not enough metal could be secured. the silver or gold content of coins was
drastically reduced. Subsequently. coins lost rapidly in value until the system
had to be replaced at the expense of the working~ wage and salary earning
population. In spite of these dire consequences. the coinage systems. in
comparison to the barter system. offer many advantages which. in particular.
shed some light upon similar implications for language sys.tems.
(b) Coinage systems. especially those based upon symbolic rather than
pragmatic standards. allow for delayed exchanges. sequential exchanges. and
multiple distributions. Delayed exchanges provide the possibility that the
seller does not need to convert the items received immediately into other
merchandise but may store coins of .corresponding value until a better opportunity
for a purchase arises. Such delayed reactions are of equal significance in the
development of language sys tems. While the nonlanguage using organism is closely
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bound to. the here-apd-nowof a given situation. the use of a language.
corresponding in abstraction to the coinage system, does not only allow for
more efficient communication but als9 for bette~ storage. especially once a
written. code of the Language has been invented.
In contrast to the barter trade, exc~anges .do. not need to be limited to
two persons interacting at a particular location but sequ~tial exchanges are
bound to result. A person who wants to buy a sheep but has no commodities
that are of interest to the seller. might reimburse him in coins; the seller.
in turn, might approach a third person who is willing to dispose of the desired
item. Frequently. the chain will extend over many more than three participants.
Coins serve as efficient intermediary. provided that their value is sufficiently
safeguarded by social agreements and rules. The social exchange of goods made
effective· through the invention of coins has similar implications as the invention
of verbal codes for linguistic systems. Once a coding system has been adopted,
messages: can be more r~l~ably t~ansmitted across long sequences of communicating
persons than under the more primitive conditions in which utterances are
spontaneously but idiosyncratically produced. In a more remote but also more
significant sense, the composition of the messages themselves becomes sequential
in nature. Linguistic tokens. suc~ ass~ntences•.wordst or speech sounds. are
ordered into ·s.trings. Nonlinguistically encoded actaon sequences are hard if
not impossible. to transmit.
Once a coinage system has been introduced. multiple distributions of goods
can be arranged easily. A person who has sold his sheep does not need to spend
his earnings at the place. of. the trade but can distribute them across many
vendors and purchase a multiplicity of items. Ag~in the improvements of such
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operations in comparison to the one-to-one exchanges of the barter-trade are
comparable to those broug}lt ab<;>utthrough the development of language systems.
In the'most direct sanse.a language user can. transmit ~is message simultaneously
to a whole group of listeners; ina remote sense, he has multiple ways of
expressing his wishes or intentions and can partition his message into smaller
chunks which are presented separately. This possibility is especially. important
for safeguarding the tran.smission when individuals with varying linguistic
skills are involved in the communication process •.
(c) The linguistic system which we have ~ompared with the coinage system
might be called a token language. It\ is founded upon basic forms or el~nts,
such as words, syllables, letters, morphemes or phonemes. Aside from determining
its elements, the main goals in the analysis of such a system consist in the
description of its syntagmatic and paradigmatic, i.e., temporal-diachronic and
spatial-synchronic properties.
A token language system lies half way between the manifold of phenomena
of the experienced world and the single token coinage system of the economy.
Both systems are reductionistic. L~guages use a large set of tokens, i.~.,
words, to denote the many different objects, events or qualities. However,
every token denotes a whole an;ay of similar items. For instance, the word
CHAIR denotes many different objects. Moreover, the relations between
tokens and the items denoted are of several different types, indicating
actor-action,' obj'ect-locatiQn.. part-whole, object-class name, and many.other
relations. The corresponding monetary'systems consist, in general, only of
one token, e.g.,. the Dollar, which designates (relates to) every poas fb Le item
and condition in the same manner. . Because, thus, a large manifold is reduced
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to just a single element, elaborate forms of operations need to be implemented.
This is done by relying on complex numerical properties of the system which
capture the large variety of items and conditions by assigning to them corre-
sponding variations in the quantity of tokens, e.g•• Dollars. The emerging
structure represents an arithmetic formalism.
In comparison to such a single token system, languages consist of many
different tokens (frequently called types) and of many different kinds of
relations between these tokens and the denoted items. Manipulations with
these tokens do not include operations of addition or multiplication but only
those of order. By applying order rules recursively, a multitude of expressions
can be generated; by applying them to different types of relations this multi-
tude is enriched much further. The emerging structures are topologically rich.
Such systems rely on cognitive operations that are mastered by older children
only, e.g., on decentration and reversibility. They remain concrete because
the tokens, e.g., the words, are thought of as building blocks reflecting
directly the conditions of the real or phenomenal world. Just as the coins,
these tokens, rather than the commodities which they represent or the labor
which produces these commodities, may ultimately come to be regarded as the
true objects of the world.
Tokens are selected and retained through social conventions which,
moreover, determine the permissible rules of operations. They fail to express
the activities and efforts that lead to their creation. As much as the further
development of the monetary system advances to a full realization of the
transactional character of econotl!ic operations, so does modem linguistics
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emphasize the interactional character of lan$uage. Whereas, traditional
linguistics oonsisted, essential~y, in the delineation of linguistic forms
and of the rules of their combinations, upits such as words, syllables, or
letters lose their significance in modern interpretations. What attains
significance are clusters of relations representing the activities within
and between language users.
The debenture system and the interaction language. (a) Economic history
resembles a progression of catastrophies in which, due to ceaseless expansions
and lack of constraint, one monetary system after the other has been wrecked.
At the terminal points of these progressions, the metal value of coins was
reduced out of proportion to its original designation, the confidence in the
system was lost, prices skyrocketed, and people were forced to return to the
barter system in order to secure their daily needs. At least since the
beginning of the 18th century, autocratic rules began to make a virtue out of
the pitiful state of their financial systems by abandoning the backing of the
currency through silver or gold and by substituting hard coins for paper money.
The first well documented case of such an innovation is that of John Law
upon whose advice Louis XV introduced paper money in France. After a few
, ,
successful years, the confidence in the financial system was lost, leading
the nation one significant step closer to the French Revolution. At about
the same time, Georg Heinrich von G8rtz financed the military adventures of
Charles XII in Sweden through the issuing of state certificates. After the
King's defeat and death the financial manipulations were violently attacked
and GBrtz was executed. Nevertheless, all leading nations have since ,then
introduced paper money and, more recently, most industrialized nations have
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abandoned the full coverage of their currency by gold or silver or; at least,
, <
do not guarantee full convertibility. This shift rep'res ents the third major
step in the development of monetary systems which we will call the debenture
system.
It would be misleading to think of paper money only in terms of the
common bills issued by national banks. Of course, these documents are of
greatest utility for everyday commerce in comparison to all other certificates
and, except for changes affecting the economy as a whole, remain fixed in their
values. Similar in kind are bonds issued and guaranteed by national governments,
states, and communities as well as by larger industrial and business organizations.
Since their value fluctuates with the condition of the economy in general, and
with the up and down of 'the money market in particular, these risks 'need to
be compensated for by the payment of interests. Next in line, stocks fluctuate
stronger than bonds. They are backed by commercial or industrial companies but
rarely by the government itself. The last, extension in the development of
paper currencies consists in the utilization of personal checks. Here, each
individual attains the role which formerly only a stable government was able
to attain, namely to guarantee the value of such transactions.
The last steps in the history of monetarY systems, thus, represent another
stage of operations and symbolic representations. Written statements become
substitutes for standard units of rare metals which, in turn, served as sub-
stitutes for the items 'to be exchanged or, at first, as direct objects of
trade. During the earliest stage iIi the history of trade, exchanges were
ti~d to the given items 'and to the persons interacting in a particular locality.
With the introduction of coins, exchanges could be teDl>orally delayed, could
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be executed along extended chains of partieipants t apd could reach simultaneously
an array of different vendors. Although this increase in flexibility led to
advances in the volume of trade t the expansion remained limited because the
total amount of rare metals backing the economic transactions increased only
slowly. With the shift toward various forms of paper money, this limitation
was abandoned and the monetary system was explicitly tied to the sum total of
activities in which a whole nation, an industrial complex, or, lastly, a single
individual was, is, or was to be engaged.
The explicit return to a standard set by the activities and labor of an
individual or groups of individuals represents only a superficial shift. As
emphasized before, the objects of trade have always been the efforts necessary
for producing particular goods rather than the merchandise itself. Even the
gold and silver accumulated in the treasuries of states represents t basically,
the efforts and work by their people. Because of the static character of
these financial units it appears, of course, as if the wealth attained had
been once and for· all removed from the activities that produced it. The
deteriorations of· su.ch financial systems, whenever the growth in productivity
failed to keep pace with the increase in monetary volume, show, however, that
such a stability is rather fictitious.
The apparent accumulative and static character of economies based on
coins makes them closely similar to linguistic systems which emphasize
linguistic elements, such as words, syllables, letters, morphemes or phonemes,
and which failed to consider language as a system of activities and interactions.
While the proto-economy of the barter trade implies too little symbolization to
make it closely comparable to language', the intermediate sys tem of coins, because
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of its elementa1istic notions. is about equally inappropriate for such a comparison.
An adequate und·erstanding of language can be achieved only through comparisons
with the debenture system which is based upon matrices of transactions rather
than upon classes of fixed elements.
The power of commercial and industrial operations in modern economic
systems is not so much determined by the amount of hard currency or cash but
by the diversification and the speed with which limited assets are transformed
and retransformed. The worth of money is determined by its owner's ability to
utilize it productively. Stored money is of lesser value and. indeed. lessening
in value as a function of continuing inflation. While such operations also
characterize the more advanced stages of the coinage system. the latter remains
more firmly anchored to the amount of cash available to the operator. The
opportunity of obtaining loans upon written declarations. of investing them
immediately in new financial operations. of transferring the profit to cover
commissions, and to obtain new resources for investments characterize the
effectiveness of the debenture system. In the extreme--and there exist numerous
documented cases of this type of operation, many bordering on i1legality--a
financial operator might gain large profits without much or without any firm
financial basis. only through quick transactions of fictitious capital. In
this extreme form. the debenture system. througn the transactions which it
facilitates, has lifted itself from its foundation. It has become a pure
system of interrelated activities. The cash which. presumably, buys these
activities and the products which they generate have become of negligible
importance.
(b) In modern linguistics, beginning with Sapir. Jesperson, and the Prague
School, the study of transactions, likewise, has overpowered the study of forms.
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Already Jesperson e~phasized that the purpose of a linguistic analysis is "to
denote all the most important interrelations of words and parts of words in
connected speech • • •• Forms- as such have no place in the system [Jesperson,
1937, pp , 13 and 104]." More recently, this idea has been expressed in the
transformational grammar of Chomsky (1965), in Piaget's (1963, 1970) cognitive
developmental psychology and in the structuralism of Levi-Strauss (1958). In
Chomsky's theory, transformatiOns relate deep structure components to the
surface structures of languages~ As for Piaget, the language-using individual
is actively participating-in these transactional processes. These operations
are confined, however, to the organism himself. An interaction with external,
e.g., social forces, is deemphasized if not disregarded in both theories.
Undoubtedly, Chomsky's theory has profoundly shaken the traditional,
elementalistic and parallelistic views of linguists and psychologists with
their undue emphasis upon-external physical stimuli and mechanical physical
reactions of, essentially, passive organisms. Piaget, like Chomsky, has strongly
emphasized the transactional ch~racter of psychological operations. He, indeed,
seems to draw the final conclusion of such an interpretation by stating that
"Transformations may be disengaged from the objects s'ubject to such transforma-
tions and the group defined solely in terms of the set of transformations
[Piaget, 1970, pp , 23-24]."
Both Chomsky and Piaget have stated their theories in mentalistic and
idealistic terms. While such an orientation has set them clearly apart from
most American psychologists, th~y have failed to assign an appropriate role to
the cultural-historical conditions into which an individual is born and within
which he .grovs , The environment is regarded as passive. All learning and
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development is initiated and directed by the organism. To attain his goals,
the individual needs, of course, information and material from the outside.
There is no place in these theories, however, for an active role of the
environment and for a codetermination of an individual's development by other
active organisms. It is at this juncture where a comparison with economic
theories becomes most pertinent because these theories bypass and advance far
beyond modern interpretations of language and cognitive development.
For a complete understanding of cognitive and linguistic operations, we
have to consider two interaction systems. One .related these operations to
their inner basis, to their physiological, biochemical foundation. The other
represents the interactions with the cultural-historical environment into which
an organism is being born. While the latter system is realized in theories of
economic operations and in the symbolic interactionism of Mead, the former
system is expressed--though incompletely--in the theories of Piaget and
Chomsky. An advanced synthesis of both interaction systems has been proposed
by Rubinstejn (1958, 1963; see also Payne, 1968; Riegel, 1972; Wozniak, 1972).
Rubinstejn extended, on the one hand, the first interaction system by
relying on Pavlov's work. He introduced the second interaction system by
relying on Vigotskijt s (1962) work and, thereby, on the historical materialism
of Marx, Engels and Lenin. The psychic activities of an' organism are seen as
the changing outcome of these two interaction systems, one tying them to their
.. '
inner material, biochemical foundation described in terms of relations within
the nervous system and sensory and motor organs, the other tying psychic
activities to their outer material, cultural-historical foundation described
in terms of relations between individuals and society. Behavior is seen as
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an activity continuously changing.in the p~ocess of inte~actions. It is not
a thing-like pa~ticle tb:at can be sepa~ated f~om these t~ansactions. Language,
likewise, is an activit" founded th~ough the two inte~actions which, in
pa~ticula~,se~esto integ~ate ne~ous activities and cultu~al-histo~ical
. .
functions. It should be studied as such a process ~ather than as a conglome~a-
... - .
tion of particles o~ forms which a~e the ~igidified abst~actions f~om ~e1ational
activities.
In o~der to car~ ~ubinstejn's p~og~am to its systematic conclusion, it
would be necessa~ to devise a methodology and theo~ of those relations upon
.' I .
which the interactions of the human being and the cu1tural-histo~ica1conditions
are based. In other wo~ds, the "~eflexology" of Pav1ov's fi~st signaling system
which explo~es the interactions of the o~ganismwith its inner, biological basis
needs to be supplemented by a "~elationology." In the following pa~t, a b~ief
sketch of such a p~ogram fo~ the study of language and its acquisition is given.
Semantic Activities: The Basis fo~ Language Development
Psychologists studying language often ~egard it as one of their most
important tasks to define the elements of thei~ analysis. Many of them settle
quickly on wo~ds or syllables as basic units if not on the infamous nonsense
syllable. To linguists, howeve~, words as well as syllables pose g~ave
p~ob1ems. But th~ir supe~io~ity is only superficial, if they do nothing
else but choose diffe~ent, although mo~e sophisticated, elements fo~ thei~
ana1ysis~ sucb as mo~helles or phonemes. Linguists do not always feel com-
pelled to overcome s~ch pa~ticle models ~f language. Of cou~se, once these
units have been defined, the scientists will p~oceed to explain how they are
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arranged into larger sequences. In psychology, associations have traditionally
provided the necessary bonds. Eventually, it was hoped, science would be able
to reconstruct the complexity of immediate experience. While in all these
interpretations elements are regarded as prior to their connections, we will
argue for the priority of relations over elements. Such a shift in interpre-
tation represents a renewed emphasis on the language users and on common,
meaningful, phenomenal experience.
Extralingual relations. Whenever information is exchanged it consists of
connected and never of isolated terms. Thus, when we explain the word ZEBRA
to a child, we say f1 (a) zebra (has) stripes" or "(b) zebra (is an) animal" and
even if we use nothing but the word ZEBRA we, most likely, point to a "real"
zebra or to the picture of one. Thus we are invoking a special, extralingual
relation between a label and the object denoted by it, which we will call
"ostensive relatiOlis." On some other occasions we may utter single words like
GO or STOP, expecting that the child will perform the requested actions. The
role of commands and demands has received considerable attention in studies
of classical conditioning by Pavlov and is basic to Skinner's interpretations
of verbal behavior. However, these "intensive relationstl are rarely considered
in studies of language development. Finally, a third type of extralingual
relations is invoked when a person utters,usually in an idiosyncratic manner,
some words or sounds such as BRAVO, OUCH, etc., thereby indicating his emotions
or feelings. Many theories on the origin of language, beginning with one proposed
by Darwin, have focused upon such connotative or "expressive relations." However
with few exceptions little attention has been given to this topic in studies
of language acquisition.
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All three extralingual relations (ostensive. intensive. expressive) are
important for the initiation and control of psycholinguistic performances but
their significance decreases during the later periods of development. +he vast
majority of information consis~s of intralingual relations. e.g •• relations
between words which are one step removed from their nonlinguistic basis.
Mutual dependence of elements and relations. An apparent difficulty in
relational interpretations is the circularity of the concepts of elements and
relations. But the problem is not different from analytical geometry. where a
point (representing an element) is defined as the intersect of two lines
(representing relatioqs). and where at the same time. a line is defined as the
connection between two points. Thus in both cases it becomes a matter of choice
of where one enters the cycle and from what place one begins to unravel the
issues.
Traditionally. an elementalistic viewpoint has dominated the natural as
well as the social sciences. By disregarding the contextual implications.
psychologists, thereby. have brought themselves into the unfortunate position
of having eliminated meaning from their consideration. i.e•• those aspects
that ought to be ·of greatest interest in their .analysis of language acquisition
and use. Elements in isolation are completely meaningless much like the ideal
nonsense syllables of the psychological laboratory. On the other hand. rela-
tions. like the reflexes in Pavlov's view. are smallest. though idiosyncratic.
units of meaning. Since it is inconceivable that human activity can ever be
completely without meaning (at least fr~m the actor's own point of view).
relations represent the immediate information given or produced; elements are
constructed and deriv~d.
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Intersection of relations. If relations are combined, two intellectual
operations can take place: The. meaning of the element at the intersection can
be explored (i.e., a word can be identified) and/or the free elements of the
intersecting relations can be recognized as members of a class. Both processes
involve an abstraction from the immediate information given, the relations.
Both processes may occur simultaneously. However, if one of the elements or
if the particular types of relations are unfamiliar to a person, considerable
time might be required for completing these processes.
Two relations can be combined in no more than four different ways. The
first combination aligns two relations opposite in directions. It represents
a trivial loop or reverberation. If relations would combine in this manner
only, for instance, if the word BLACK would always lead to WHITE and WHITE
always to BLACK, then no relational structure would exist. Fortunately,
psycholinguistic relations never comoine exclusively in such a trivial manner
but always reveal sufficient variation in their arrangements.
Chaining
Stimulus
Equivalence
Response
Equivalence
The three remaining combinations of two relations shown above are identical
with the chaining, the response equivalence and the stimulus equivalence para-
digms (Jenkins & Palermo, 1964). The first attaches one relation at the end of
the other. If nothing else but such chaining paradigms were prevailing, a
language would consist of idiosyncratic strings. More likely, various chains
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will criss-cross each other, thus, lending transient strength to the network
of relations of which a language is made up. The last two paradigms, ~n
particular, ,allow for the identification of the intersecting element and for
the recognition of classes. In the response equivalence paradigm two relations
diverge from a common left hand term, leading, in the sample below, from COW to
DRINK and RUN. Both right hand terms explicate--we maintain--the meaning of
CO~. In the stimulus equivalence paradigm, two relations converge upon a shared
right .hand term, e s g , , leading from COW and HORSE to RUN•. Both left hand terms
ex~licate the meaning of RUN (see Quarterman & Riegel, 1968; Zivian & Riegel,
1969). If more than two relations are combined, considerable variation in the
patterns results. The methodology for analyzing such networks has been
considerably advanced during recent years (see Harary, Norman & Cartwright,
1965; Sokal & Sneath, 1963).
Reductionistic and discriminative aspects of language. When a linguist
explores an unknown language, he needs to rely on extra.Hngua l, relations.
Except for the rare case of unequivocal proper names, there will always be a
large range of items denoted by a common label but varying in many attributes.
If this were not so, the language would be nonreductionistic. Only when
numerous items are commonly labeled does a language become an efficient means
for communication. Consequently, for any term, the linguist needs relational
information under numerous conditions irt order to gain an understanding of
the full range of its meaning.
Often, the linguist's task has been compared with that .of a child acquiring
his first Language , . 'Such comparison would be simplistic, if we were to
restrict it to information reduction through labeling. Concurrently with
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such performance, single objects, events, or qualities are denoted by different
labels. For instance, a child might be called BOY, LAD, PAUL, SMITH, NAUGHTY
ONE, etc. The choice of the .label varies with the situation and depends upon
the particular discrimination aimed for. An item might be called THING (if
there are no other relevant items), BLOCK (if there are also beads and marbles),
BLACK ONE (if there are red and white items), etc. The exclusion or disregard
of attributes is often as important as the positive denotation of an item (see
Trabasso, 1970). Moreover, the discriminating use of labels makes their 'appli-
cation more productive than when their function was exclusively reductionistic.
In terms of our interpretations, the reductionistic character of language
is represented by relations diverging from the label and pointing toward the
set of denoted objects, events, or qualities. The discriminative character,
on the other hand, is represented by a set of labels converging upon a single
object, event, or quality. Reductionistic and discriminative properties of
language co-exist dialectically. The same is true for the related issue of
identifying the meaning of a word or of recognizing a class. The first implies
the focusing upon a single term from which several relations diverge; the
latter implies the focusing upon members of a distribution many of which
might be linked to a single item, e.g., their class name, and all of which are
linked to some shared items, e.g., shared functions, parts, locations, etc.
Criteria for classes. Many psychologists regard the stimulus and the
response equivalence paradigms as sufficient conditions for the determinat10n
of classes. However, these two paradigms represent minimal criteria only
because they imply that any two items elicited by a common stimulus or leading
to a common response would form a class. They are also abstractions because,
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in such simple forms, they occur under laboratory conditions only. In concrete
situations, a multitude of combinations are superimposed and embedded in one
another, making up the complex network of the natural language and, thereby,
strengthening the classes at varying degrees. But because of their abstract-
ness, these paradigms, next to simple relations, may serve as units into which
this network can be partitioned.
cow ~::NK
HORSE -::::::""-0+ RUN
The superposition of the paradigms can be demonstrated by the example shown
above. If a chd.Ld has learned that COWs DRINK, EAT and RUN and that HORSEs EAT
and RUN, he has formed a network of relations involving two semantic classes.
COW is a stimulus for three response equivalence paradigms involving the terms:
DRINK/EAT, EAT/RUN, DRINK/RUN, respectively. HORSE is the stimulus for one
response equivalence paradigm: EAT/RUN. Furthermore, EAT and RUN, respectively,
are the responses for the two stimulus equivalence paradigms both involving
COW/HORSE.
Undoubtedly, both the classes of right and of left hand terms are more
firmly established than when only a single response or a single stimulus
equivalence paradigm was involved. The strength of clasaes might, indeed,
be determined by enume~~ting the number of stimulus or response paradigms
embedded in the more complex display (see Riegel, 1970). Once classes have
attained a certain strength, a child might generate novel utterances without
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ever having been exposed to them before. e s g•• in the ..example above. the
child might realize that HORSEs DRINK.
Types of intralingual relations. Thus far we discussed general procedures
for identifying the meaning of words and for determining word classes but we
have not given any thought to the types of relations involved. Apparently.
many types of relations are conceivable and. most important. will lead to
different classifications. Thus. ZEBRA together with TIGER. CANDY-STICK and
BARBER-SIGN are forming a class sharing STRIPES as a common part or quality.
On the other hand. ZEBRA will be categorized with ELEPHANT. NEGRO. and NILE.
all of which are located in AFRICA. Thus. different relations lead to only
partially overlapping categories. This result. in our opinion. is the main
reason why philosophers. linguists and psychologists have failed, so far, to
develop and to operationalize comprehensive semantic interpretations.
The above problems are further complicated by the mutual dependence of
classes and general (class) relations. This difficulty is similar to the
circularity in defining elements and simple relations. Classes, as we have
argued, consist of those elements that share certain relations such as
actor-action relations. On the other hand, we might conceive of a class
of animals and of a class of actions which. in conjunction. define the
general relationship between them. These two ways of looking at classes and
general relations correspond to the alternative principles elaborated by .
Dedekind (1893) and Frege (1903) respectively.
When considering developmental progression, however. it see~ unlikely
that the recognition of general relations precedes the recognition of classes.
Once simple relations are given, classes can be derived; once classes are derived.
the general relationship between them can be apprehended. Such a general
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relationship does "not represent anything more than the totality of all simple
relations between each member of one class and each member of the other class.
Similar to the concept of classes. no surplus meaning ought to be attached to
the general relations between classes.
Relying on Piagetts interpretations (Inhelder &Piaget. 1958). we have
previously (Riegel & Riegel. 1963) categorized general relations into three
groups: (1) "Logical relations between the words themselves and derived by
verbal abstraction. such as synonymity, superordination. coordination, and
subordination. (2) Infralogical or physical relations based on the denoted
objects. events. or qualities and derived by abstracting features from these
physical items such as parts, wholes, locations, preceding, contemporaneous,
or succeeding events. (3) Grammatical relations derived from the phenomenal
(surface) structure of linguistic expressions and representing concatenations
between the major parts of speech, Le•• nouns, verbs and modifiers.
The above list of general "relations is neither exhaustive nor independent.
It needs to be supplemented on the basis of more abstract considerations leading
to the classification of relations into those that are: Symmetrical vs.
nonsymmetrical. transitive vs. nontransitive, reflexive vs. nonreflexive,"etc.
(see Carnap, 1928, p. 21). Our list may also be supplemented by semantic
relations discussed in Fillmore's (1968) case grammar and in the developmental
studies by Bloom (1970).
Implicit and explicit relations. ;J:f we receive the abbreviated messages:
ZEBRA -+ ANIMAL. ZEBRA -+ STRIPEs, ZEBRA -+ RUNs. we not only have four dif-
ferent words at our disposal but the implicit relational information of
superord1nation. whole-part, and actor-action. The failure of a particle
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model of language to deal adequately with both semantic and syntactic inter-
pretations is necessitated by the disregard for this relational information.
Thus far, our discussion has been concerned with relations implied in meaningful
combinations of words (and strictly speaking, all combinations of words are
meaningful). An implicit relation is unique for the words which it connects;
it is general if many words are combined in the same manner, Le., if the
left hand and right hand elements are members of two different classes.
The transmission of relational information 't\Tould be insufficiently safe-
guarded if no other and partially redundant clues were built Lnco the natural
languages. Thus, instead of the abbreviated messages listed above, we usually
receive phrases like, "The zebra is an animal" or "The stripes of the zebra"
or "The zebra runs." In these examples, the aUXiliary IS (used as a proper
verb) plus the indefinite article AN explicate the logical relation of super-
ordination; the definite article THE and the preposition OF explicate the
infralogical relation of whole-part; only the grammatical relation of actor-
action does not receive any further explication except for the inflection,
s , marking the verb. We call these explicit clues redundant, because they
do not occur regularly in the' ".telegraphic" speech of young children.
Apparently, implicit relational information is prior to its explicated form.
The significance of our last statement is underscored when we realize
that many single words have inherent relational features. Such implicit
relationality is most strongly exhibited among adjectives and adverbs whose
role of modifying nouns and verbs necessitates this feature. Their relational-
ity is further extended through the use of comparative constructions which
make this part of speech an exceptionally rich topic for a relational analysis
(see Clark, 1970; Huttenlocher & Higgins, 1971; Riegel, 1973). Also, verbs
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relating to noun subjects and/or to noun objects imply such relationality,
e.g.', PUSH, PULL, GIVE, TAKE, etc. With rhe exception of professional and
kinship terms, e.g., FOREMAN, UNCLE, BROTHER, etc., such implicit relationality
is not very common among nouns, however.
Compounding of relations. With our discussion of explicit relations we
have, finally, reached areas of inquiry traditionally explored by linguistics
as the foundation of language. In contrast, our own discussion did not begin
with an elaboration of these abstract structures but was founded upon the
concrete e~periences and activities of the real child. Throughout, the order
of our topics corresponded to the natural order in which a language is acquired.
After sufficient relational information is obtained, the child may identify
elements as.well as classes. Next, explicit relational clues, such as the
prepositions, .will be utilized and the child will, increasingly, obey the
proper sequential order of semantic classes. At this moment the child is
still not operating within syntax of the linguists because he has not yet
a sufficient grasp of the more abstract gr~atical classes nor of the rules
of their combination and transformation. He will be ready for these operations
when the classes and class relations available to him have become sufficiently
general. With few exceptions, semantic classes are subsets of $rammatical
classes and, without exception, semantics is prior to syntax.
When two or more elements co-occur regularly, the relations involved may
begin to function as elements of,a higher order. Such a stratification occurs,
for instance, when words are compounded, such as yellow-bird, store-keeper,
window-pane, etc. These conditions can be depicted by bracketing, i.e.,
(YELLOW ~ BIRD). Subsequently, a telegraphic sentence could be expressed as
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(YELLOW + BIRD) + SINGs, in contrast to the original formula YELLOW + BIRD:
BIRD + SINGs.
The possibilities provided through compoundings are not limited to words
but lead us directly into questions of semantic and syntactic levels, strata,
and hierarchies. The above example represents, indeed, the combination of
a noun-phrase, NP, i.e., YELLOW + BIRD, with the verb SING. Instead of
bracketi~g, Chomsky has preferred to depict hierarchical organizations by'
tree diagrams:
,S
// \\
NP
/ \\ \.
YELLOW BIRD SINGs
Thus, our example provides the important connection with the topic of syntactic
structures and their acquisition during childhood (see McNeill, 1970a,b;
Slobin, 1971).
Relations of relations. In spite of their concern with language structure,
psycholinguists have paid little attention to what we might call relations of
relations or the logical connections of relations. Two relations, as discussed
above, can be monotonically combined leading to the derivation of classes such
as "animals" and "animated actions." They can also become a part of more
complex expressions. For this purpose, connectors need to be introduced.
Mainly two types of function words serve such connective purposes: conjunctions
and relative pronouns. In particular, symmetric~l conjunctions (AND, TOO, ALSO,
AS WELL AS, etc.) and relative (asymmetrical) pronouns (WHICH, WHO, and THAT)
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express--in analogy to our former distinction--logical relations of coordination
and superordination-subordination as in the following examples:
Coordination: (EAGLE ~ FL~Es) and (RABBIT + RUNs)
~uperordination-Subordination: (RABBIT ~ RUNs) which (EAGLE ~ HAUNTs)
or RABBIT which (EAGLE ~ HAUNTs) ~ RUNs
Asymmetrical conjunctions (IF••• THEN t BECAUSE, BEFORE, AFTER, e t c , ) and
relative adverbs (WHERE, WHEN, WHY, etc.) generate infralogical relations
between relations and represent spatial, temporal, causal and other physical
conditions as in the following examples:
Spatial:
Temporal/Causal:
(HOUSE.~ BURNs) where (JOHN ~ LIVEs)
(CORN ~ GROWs) after (SUN ~ SHINEs)
if (EAGLE ~ FLIEs) then (RABBIT ~ RUNs) etc.
In spite of the lack of evidence, these logical and infralogical relations
of relations are prior and of greater importance in the language acquisition
process than any syntactic structures reflecting formal and abstract linguistic
conventions •. Since permutations within logical and infralogical structures
produce, in most cases, changes in interpretations, such I:l "syntax" is more
fundamental than the aspects of syntax consnon.ly analyzed by linguists. The
child will have to learn how to operate with logical and infralogical
combinations; ~ a by-product he generates sentences that incorporate words
according to their syntactic rules.
Psycholinguistic systems. If, instead of elements and simple relations,
we discuss classes and general relations, we shift from what Chomsky has
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called finite state grammars to phrase structure grammars. Of course, such
an extension is not limited to syntax but, more important from our own point
of view, holds for semantic systems as well. Instead of proposing simple
relations such as RABBIT + RUNs, EAGLE + FLIEs, and of elaborating different
types of combinations, we argue, now, in terms of semantic classes, such as
"animals," "food," "toys," "animated actions," etc., and in terms of general
relations which not only link but also define these classes. Since there
are no nonover1apping semantic classes, only the most for~al and abstract
features of the language, namely those of syntax, have been described in an
unambiguous manner. But even here, multiple classifications often outweigh
unique assignments. The ambiguities of semantic classifications may seem
disturbing, but they also guarantee the richness of linguistic expressions
and the creative potential of the language.
Rules for combining semantic or syntactic classes are more general than
rules for chaining simple relations. While thus, the resulting semantic and
syntactic systems are more powerful, Chomsky regards them as almost equally.
insufficient because they do not consider transformational operations.
Although transformational systems might be still more comprehensive than
the other models, it is well conceivable that these various semantic and
syntactic systems coexist in the child and that large portions of his
language skills might be sufficiently explained by systems of classes and
general relations or even by transitional probabilities without invoking more
complex operations.
Inversion and negation. A language model based on classes and general
relations accounts for the well documented generative skills of children
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number system defines nominal scales whic;h, when applied to observations,
allow for the categorization of items in distinct classes to which. in turn,
labels, such as words, letters or numerals may be assigned. Since there exists
no order between the classes, the degree of transformation is almost unlimited
and consists in the relabelling of the classes and their members. Differing
from linguistics, however, logical or mathematical transformations keep the sig-
nificant properties of the system invariant, i.e., the classes remain the same
even though their .labels have changed. When additional axioms on the transi-
tivity of the operations are imposed, ordinal systems are generated. Subsequently,
logical or mathematical transformations, in keeping the order invariant, are more
restricted than those applicable to nominal systems. Ordinal scales might be
monotonically stretched or comp.ressed but the order of any two it~ms may not
be altered.
Unfortunately. linguists have used the term transformation in precisely
the opposite sense. Linguistic transformations, in producing variance, gain
importance the more complex the system to which they are applied. In
categorical systems they lead to the identification of the inverse of classes.
In ordered systems. such as in various types of syntax, they imply rearrange-
ments of these classes which, most often, require changes in interpretations.
Linguistic transformations deal with the. reordering of sequences of classes
or, at a lower level, of elements. by which, for instance, declarative state-
ments are changed into questions, passive statements, negative statements,
and vice versa, or by which deep structure phrases are converted into surface
structure e~pressions and vice versa.
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Concluding Remarks
With our br'ief ~eference to linguistic transformations) we have returned to
the main issues of the first part of our chapter in which we tried to demonstrate
that a purely 'transactional analysis is conceivable and has been successfully
implemented in economic operations. Language) likewise) ought to be regarded
as an activity and not merely as a system of particles or tokens) products or
'commodities. Such a conclusio~if accepted) does not contradict our analysis
in the second part of our chapter where we emphasized the relational) trans-
actional character 6f linguistic operations. In the following summary, we
attempt') once more, to show the congruence of these two aspects of language
development.
At the protoeconomic level, trade consists in the exchange of particular
items on a one-to-one basis and is bound to a given situation. Such a system
is concrete with little symbolic representation. But the items exchanged are
not to be viewed as having thing-like) substantive character; what is exchanged
are the activities and the labor necessary to produce them. Similarly)
linguistic operations at this level involve extralingual relations between
labels and obj~cts) internal states or--most important--actions. If a
comparison with Piaget's developmental levels is attempted) the protoeconomic
and the protolinguistic systems are characterized by sensory-motor activities.
The next economic system is comparable to the level of concrete intellectual
operations. It relies on standard commodities represented by concrete materials
or objects, e.g.) gold or silver) 'and allow's for a wide range and much more
flexible operations) such as sequential and multiple distributions of traded
goods, as well as for advance storage and delayed actions. The conceptual
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danger 'of such a system lies in the tendency to regard its basic monetary unit
as fixed, universal entities. History has repeatedly shown that this apparent
stability is easily shattered'as the basis of activity, representing the labor
and efforts by the participating people, is brought at variance with the standards
of the system.
Traditionally, similar viewpoints have dominated psychology and linguistics,
namely the view that language consists of sets of basic units, such as words,
syllables, letters, morphemes or phonemes, from which the mo~e complex forms
are derived. Thus, the view of language as an activity and a process is either
disregarded or lost. Just as different currencies represent diffe~ent monetary
systems, so do different sets of linguistic elements represent different languages
or dialects. Thus, there exists variability and between them (linear) convert-
ibility or (nonlinear, transformational) translation. The universal basis of
different linguistic systems is represented by the protolanguage of the
preceding level with its notion of the identity of operations. Correspondingly,
the protoeconomy of, the barter system represents the universal features of
the more advanced trading operations based upon property rights. At the second
economic level, more specific rules have to be implemented determining the
standard, the order, and the distribution of exchanges. Likewise, at the
second linguistic leyel, more specific lexicological conventions and syntactic
rules of order and restitution are required.
Only at the third stage of development does an analysis of the economic
system advance our understanding of linguistic systems to a significant degree.
Monetary forms characteristic for this stage and represented by certificates,
bonds,. stocks, and checks are representational units of exchange. They. help
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us to realize that it is not the object nor any particular material, such ·as
rare metals, which are exchanged but the labor and activities of people
producing these objects and operating with these documents. Transactions
on such elusive bases require explicit rules of conduct of which only a minor
portion concerns the specific relationship of these certificates to the
objects of trade. Most of them deal with intraeconomic relations.
The conditions are similar in linguistic operations. Only when we realize
that lingUistic units, SUcll as words, syllables, or letters, are mere abstractions
from the stream of operations that characterizes language, do we gain a full
understanding of linguistic systems. These operations constitute the information
immediately given through the interrelating activities of communicating
individuals. An understanding of these interactions can be gained only if
these activities are studied as they are produced and perceived; the products
of these interactions are rigidified objectifications that do not capture the
constituting activities of languages.
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